Overcoming the Downs-Thomson Paradox by transit subsidy policies
Document Type
Journal Article
Publication Date
2017
Subject Area
place - urban, economics - pricing, economics - subsidy, infrastructure - fleet management, ridership - mode choice, policy - congestion
Keywords
Transit operating schemes, Downs-Thomson Paradox, Departure time and mode choices, Transit subsidy, Road pricing
Abstract
Consider a competitive highway/transit transportation system in which travelers either drive on the bottleneck-constrained highway or take scheduled trains from home to the workplace in the morning peak hours. This paper explores the impact of bottleneck capacity expansion on transit operating schemes (fleet size and fare) and travelers’ departure time and mode choices. Due to the potential occurrence of the Downs-Thomson (D-T) Paradox after highway capacity expansion, the paper investigates whether the D-T Paradox can be circumvented by implementing transit subsidy policies. The effects of different transit subsidy schemes are explored: subsidizing the transit company (cost subsidy) or the passengers (passenger subsidy) with the financial support from either government funding or road pricing revenue. For each combination of subsidy method and financial sourcing, the condition for overcoming the D-T Paradox is established.
Rights
Permission to publish the abstract has been given by Elsevier, copyright remains with them.
Recommended Citation
Wang, W., Wang, D.Z.W., Zhang, F., Sun, H., Zhang, W., & Wu, J. (2017). Overcoming the Downs-Thomson Paradox by transit subsidy policies. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Vol. 95, pp. 126–147.
Comments
Transportation Research Part A Home Page:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/09658564